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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip: Punitive Damages
and the Modern Meaning of Procedural Due Process
In May 1990 a Texas jury found that agents of Woodmen of the
World Life Insurance Company had defrauded teacher's aide Sylvia
Uriegas of $212,000.1 The jury awarded her compensatory damages,

plus punitive damages of over $55,000,000.2 Although only the jury
members will ever know precisely how they reached this figure, it is clear
that plaintiff's attorney provided them with scant encouragement to apply any rational process in making their determination. Reflecting on the
case, which he characterized as "a classic passion play,"3 plaintiff's attorney Pat Maloney summarized his trial strategy:
"The case wasn't that exciting unless the jury became outraged.
We told the jury that this company took advantage of Sylvia
when she was at her nadir; she was pregnant and her husband
had just died.... So I said that since Woodmen of the World
took Sylvia's nest egg, they ought to take the company's. I
asked for the entire nest egg." 4
Nor did the court provide the jury with much rational guidance. In
Texas, as in most states,5 the decisions whether to award punitive damages, and, if so, how much to award, are left almost entirely to the jury's
discretion.6 The only appeal to the jury's sense of reason came, presuma1. See EtAL, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 21, 1991, at S7. This article describes the trial and verdict
in Uriegas v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co. Id.
2. Id.
3. Developing a Mutual Rapport, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 11, 1991, at S5.
4. Id (quoting Pat Maloney). The company's nest egg amounted to $212,000,000. Id.
Attorneys are not entirely free to appeal to the jury's passion. See, eg., I LINDA R. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PurrnvE DAMAGES § 5.5(c), at 213-14 (2d ed. 1989) (observing that courts place general limits on attorney conduct in closing statements, disallowing
misleading statements, improper innuendos, and prejudicial remarks, as well as any mention of
insurance, compromise, or settlement).
5. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
6. If anything, Texas juries receive more guidance than most. Compare Transcontinental
Gas Pipe Line Co. v. American Nat'l Petroleum Co., 763 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. Ct. App.
1988) (enumerating factors for the jury to take into account) with Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1037 n.1 (1991) (excerpting jury instructions given by Alabama trial
judge permitting jurors wide discretion to impose or not impose punitive damages). The Texas
court instructed the jurors to consider
not merely the act or acts of a Defendant .... [but also] all the circumstances, including (1) the extent of any damages suffered by Plaintiff; (2) the nature of the wrong;
(3) the frequency of the wrongs committed; (4) the character of the conduct involved;
(5) the degree of the wrongdoer's culpability; (6) the situation and sensibilities of the
parties concerned; (7) the extent to which the defendant's conduct offends a public
sense of propriety; and (8) the size of an award needed to deter similar wrongs in the
future.
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bly, from defense counsel. The jurors were free to ignore that plea and to
subjugate it to the strong sense of indignation and outrage that Maloney
invoked in his closing argument.
Both lawyers and laymen perceive rationality and proportionality as
fundamental to the legitimacy of law.7 Accordingly, most lawyers and
laymen would probably sense something egregious about the verdict in
this Texas case; there must be something unjust, and perhaps even unconstitutional, about any process that yields such a disproportionate verdict. In fact, recent large awards of punitive damages have awakened the
constitutional sensibilities of several Justices of the United States
Supreme Court.' More specifically, such sizeable awards raise serious
questions under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment 9
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1" In the
past few years, as both the frequency and amount of punitive damages
awards have increased dramatically, the Court has had several opportunities to consider fully the legality of such awards. The Court, however, has thus far refused to impose any constitutional limits on punitive
damages. In 1989 it rejected the argument that the Excessive Fines
Clause applies to punitive damages awards.' Last term the Court comTranscontinentalGas, 763 S.W.2d at 819. For the instructions in PacificMutual, see infra text
accompanying note 23. The jury in TranscontinentalGas awarded plaintiff $16,000,000 in
punitive damages. TranscontinentalGas, 763 S.W.2d at 819.
For a discussion of the detrimental effects of unpredictability, see John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L.
REv. 965, 986-94 (1984) (arguing that uncertainty in legal standards, including damage
awards, generates economic inefficiency).
7. See, eg., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 349 (1910) ("[It [is] ... a precept of
justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.").
8. See, eg., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 280-81 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that although the due process issue was not properly before
the court, "[s]everal of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of possible
civil damages that may be awarded to a private litigant, the Due Process Clause forbids damages awards that are 'grossly excessive'" (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86,
111 (1909))); id, at 282-301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
strenuously that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment proscribes excessive
punitive damages awards); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87-89
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Appellant has
touched on a due process issue that I think is worthy of the Court's attention. .. ").
9. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10. The relevant portion of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. ."
U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
11. See, eg., Pacific MuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1038 n.4; id. at 1066 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See generally MARK PETERSON ET AL., PuNrrrvE DAMAGES-EMPIRICAL FINDINGS (1987)
(documenting evidence of dramatic rise in frequency and amount of punitive damages awards).
12. Browning-Ferris,492 U.S. at 263-64. For a discussion of this case, see infra note 173.
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pleted its detachment of the Federal Constitution from the regulation of
punitive damages awards in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip 13 when it held that the Due Process Clause places practically no limits on state courts' ability to allow these awards. Thus, punitive damages
awards remain almost completely within the discretion of the jury.
After analyzing the majority, 14 concurring,"5 and dissenting 16 opinions in Pacific Mutual, this Note will examine the prior holdings that
guided the Court in placing punitive damages within the context of due
process.17 The Note concludes that the Court effectively blocked future
due process challenges to the standard common-law practice of awarding
punitive damages. After imposing a vague, easily met standard for due
process, the Court left open the possibility that the amount of some
awards may be unconstitutionally excessive. 8 In terms of Pacific Mutual's wider impact on due process analysis, the Note determines that the
Court is reorienting itself toward the traditional view that when a procedure was well established at the time of the adoption of the Due Process
Clause, its history is dispositive of its constitutionality. 19 Finally, the
Note argues that, although its result was essentially correct, the Court's
muddy explanation has created a great deal of confusion; this confusion
could have been avoided had the Court explicitly stated its holding, as
Justice Scalia did in his concurring opinion. 20 Thus, the Note concludes
that Justice Scalia's description better presents the proper test for due
process and should form the standard.
In 1982 Cleopatra Haslip and several coworkers who had purchased
similar health insurance policies from Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company filed suit in Alabama state court against the company and one
of its agents, alleging that the agent had failed to remit to Pacific Mutual
the premiums he had collected from the plaintiffs, and thereby had
caused their policies to lapse.21 The judge submitted the case to the jury
13. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
14. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined; Justice Souter did not participate. See infra
notes 27-51 and accompanying text.
15. Justices Scalia and Kennedy wrote separate opinions concurring with the judgment.
See infra notes 52-81, 82-91 and accompanying text.
16. Justice O'Connor was the sole dissenter. See infra notes 92-129 and accompanying
text.
17. See infra notes 134-74 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 204-12 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
21. PacificMut., 111 S. Ct. at 1036-37.
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on a theory of fraud,2 2 further instructing them as follows:
Now, if you find that fraud was perpetrated then in addition to compensatory damages you may in your discretion...
award an amount of money known as punitive damages.
This amount of money is awarded to the plaintiff but it is
not to compensate the plaintiff for any injury. It is to punish
the defendant. Punitive means to punish or it is also called exemplary damages, which means to make an example. So, if you
feel or not feel, but if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff... has had a fraud perpetrated upon
them and as a direct result they were injured and in addition to
compensatory damages you may in your discretion award punitive damages.
Now, the purpose of awarding punitive or exemplary damages is to allow money recovery to the plaintiffs... by way of
punishment to the defendant and for the added purpose of protecting the public by detering [sic] the defendant and others
from doing such wrong in the future. Imposition of punitive
damages is entirely discretionary with the jury, that means you
don't have to award it unless this jury feels that you should do
SO.
Should you award punitive damages, in fixing the amount,
you must take into consideration the character and the degree
of the wrong as shown
by the evidence and necessity of prevent23

ing similar wrong.
The jury returned a general verdict for Haslip in the amount of
$1,040,000, the punitive component of which amounted to at least
$840,000.24 Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama,
which affirmed and specifically upheld the punitive damages award;2 1the
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to review that decision. In the Supreme Court, Pacific Mutual argued that the common22. Id. at 1037. The case against Pacific Mutual was submitted under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. The Court upheld the constitutionality of that decision over Pacific Mutual's contention that doing so unfairly shifted the jury's focus toward the assets of the company in determining the amount of punitive damages appropriate for the agent's actions,
thereby violating Pacific Mutual's Fourteenth Amendment right to fundamental fairness. Id.
at 1040-41.
23. Id at 1037 n. 1 (citation omitted). Pacific Mutual did not object to this charge at the
time, and no evidence of its financial worth had been introduced. Id at 1037.
24. Id at 1037 n.2. Plaintiff's attorney had requested $200,000 in compensatory and
$3,000,000 in punitive damages; for the purposes of its decision, the Court credited the greatest
possible amount to compensatory damages ($200,000), leaving a minimum punitive damages
amount of $840,000 out of $1,040,000. Id
25. Id. at 1037. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537, 543 (Ala. 1989),
aff'd, Il1I.
Ct. 1032 (1991).
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law procedure for awarding punitive damages provides the jury with unlimited discretion in violation of defendant's right to due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court rejected Pacific Mutual's argument and affirmed the
award,26 but divided into four analytical camps. The majority held the
award valid for two reasons. First, giving juries free rein in assessing
punitive damages was an established common-law practice at the time
Congress adopted the Due Process Clause; consequently, the procedure
cannot per se violate due process.27 Second, the award against Pacific
Mutual was not reached by an entirely irrational process, and thus did
not lack fundamental fairness.2"
The majority first noted that punitive.damages have long been a part
of the common law. 29 At common law, the imposition of punitive damages consisted of two general steps. First, the jury was instructed "to
consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to deter similar wrongful
conduct"3 0 in determining the appropriateness and amount of punitive
damages. Second, the jury's award then was reviewed for reasonableness
by the trial and appellate courts.3 1 Juries had unlimited discretion to
determine and award punitive damages before the Fifth Amendment was
adopted,32 and the two-step common-law method of assessing punitive
damages was well entrenched at the time of adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 3 That amendment's drafters offered no indication that
they intended to modify the practice.3 4 Accordingly, the Court concluded that vesting the jury with great discretion in awarding punitive
damages is not "so inherently unfair as to deny due process and be per se
unconstitutional."3 5
The Court, however, stated that the antiquity of the practice of
awarding punitive damages was not dispositive. Instead, it held that pu26. Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1046.
27. d at 1041-43.
28. Id at 1044.
29. Idk at 1041-42.
30. Id. at 1042. The Alabama instructions are typical of those adopted in other states.
See, ag., I ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL § 35.01 (2d ed. 1971); 1 OHIO
JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 23.70 (1988).
31. Pacific MuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1042. See generally SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 4,
§ 6.1 (noting that most courts have not enunciated clear standards for review of punitive damages awards).
32. Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1042. For a detailed history of punitive damages, see 1
JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1 (2d
ed. 1989); SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 4, § 1.
33. PacificMut., 111 S. Ct. at 1042.
34. Id at 1043.
35. Id.
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nitive damage awards that" 'run wild'" might violate due process if the
award is an "extreme result[] that jar[s] one's constitutional sensibilities.",36 Refusing to adopt a "bright line" test for determining the constitutionality of punitive damages, the Court held merely that "concerns of
reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court when the case is
tried to a jury properly enter into the constitutional calculus."'37 Applying this calculus to the facts before it, the Court indicated that a future,
successful constitutional challenge to a punitive damages award will require a showing either that the award possessed no rational basis whatsoever, or that the jury received absolutely no guidance.3"
The Court first examined whether the Pacific Mutual jury's discretion had been meaningfully restrained.39 In making that determination,
the Court assessed the adequacy of the instructions given by the trial
judge ° and sought to determine whether they advanced a legitimate state
interest while still protecting defendant's interest in avoiding irrationally
imposed liability.4 1 The Court considered several aspects of the instructions given by the trial judge in concluding that they provided adequate
guidance to serve these ends.4 2 First, the instructions advised the jury
that the purposes of punitive damages are to punish the defendant and to
deter others from similar conduct.4 3 In addition, the instructions informed the jurors that they were to take into account the character and
degree of the individual defendant's wrong, as well as the necessity of
deterrence.' Overall, the majority held that in their entirety, the instructions advanced a legitimate state interest in punishment and deterrence and thereby provided a basis for rational correlation with the
defendant's conduct.4"
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Reasonableness exists when the award does not lack "objective criteria," id at 1046;
so long as the jury receives at least minimum guidance, and "discretion is exercised within
reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied." Ide at 1044. After articulating the parameters
of its constitutional test, the Court announced that it was limiting its holding to a determination whether the punitive damages assessed against Pacific Mutual met the requirements of due
process. Id at 1043.
39. Id. at 1044.
40. Id For the trial judge's instructions, see supra text accompanying note 23.
41. Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1044. An irrational award, the Court suggested, would
thwart defendant's "interest in rational decisionmaking." Ide
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The Court noted that discretion in punitive damages cases was no greater than
that in many well-established areas of law, such as "the best interests of the child," "reasonable
care," "due diligence," or compensation for pain and suffering or mental anguish. Id.
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Once the Court determined that the jurors had received sufficient
guidance, the only remaining issue was whether they had exercised their
discretion reasonably.'4 6 In addressing that issue, the Court considered
two additional features of Alabama procedure: the post-trial review and
the further appellate review.4 7 The Court concluded that the trial court's
review sufficiently guaranteed that the jurors had reached a decision
within reasonable constraints.4" Trial courts in Alabama, when reviewing damages for excessiveness, consider several factors: defendant's culpability, desirability of deterrence of others, impact on the parties, and
other considerations such as the effect on innocent third parties.49
The Court then observed that Pacific Mutual had received the full
protection of additional review by the Alabama Supreme Court, including a comparative analysis.50 Because Pacific Mutual had received the
benefit of all the procedural safeguards of Alabama law, the Court held
that the state had not violated the company's right to due process.-"
Justice Scalia concurred in the result, but sharply criticized the majority's reasoning.5 2 In his view, the Court's inquiry into the due process
sufficiency of the assessment of punitive damages should have ended with
the determination that the practice existed at the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Because "a process that accords with
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1044-46.
48. Id. at 1044. Often, however, appellate courts merely rubberstamp the jury award.
See, eg., Durham v. Pekrul, 104 Wis. 2d 339, 349, 311 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1981) ("[Ihe trial
judge, who was familiar with the demeanor of the parties and the intricacies of the conduct of
the trial, upheld the jury's finding of punitive damages. Where the record supports the jury's
award of punitive damages... an appellate court should not set aside the award in toto."); see
also 2 GHIARDI & KIRCHER, supra note 32, § 18.04, at 13-16 (noting that the trial judge must
afr the verdict if there is evidence to support it, and that only a verdict that is excessive as a
matter of law may be overturned).
49. Pacific MuL, 111 S.Ct. at 1044. The Supreme Court of Alabama had established
those factors in Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (Ala. 1986), and refined
them in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989), which announced
several other factors to be taken into account in determining whether the size of an award is
reasonably related to deterrence and retribution. Green Oil, 539 So. 2d at 223-24; see also
PacificMuL, 111 S.Ct. at 1045 (discussing Green Oil and its effects); infra text accompanying
note 106 (same).
50. PacificMut, 111 S.Ct. at 1045-46. The Alabama Supreme Court considers several
factors set forth in Green Oil, see infra text accompanying note 106, in assessing the appropriateness of the award. Pacific Mutual, however, is ambiguous as to whether such further review
is constitutionally mandated; the Court stated that the post-trial procedure "ensures meaningful and adequate review," Pacific MuL, 111 S.Ct. at 1044, and characterized the appellate
review as "an additional check on the jury's or trial court's discretion." Id. at 1045.
51. Pacific MuL, 111 S.Ct. at 1046.
52. Id. at 1046-54 (Scalia, J.,concurring in judgment).
53. Id. at 1048 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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such a tradition and does not violate the Bill of Rights necessarily constitutes 'due' process," Justice Scalia charged, any inquiry into "fairness"
or "reasonableness" was inappropriate.5 4
Justice Scalia began his analysis by discussing the Fifth Amendment
framers' understanding of the term "due process of law."5 5 He concluded that the term meant merely customary procedure according to the
"law of the land"-a guarantee which originated in the Magna Carta 6-and that the framers possessed this understanding through their acquaintance with the writings of Sir Edward Coke.57 He observed that the seminal case interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,5" adopted precisely this understanding of due process.5 9 Justice Scalia found no evidence that any change in this understanding had occurred in the twelve
years between Murray's Lessee and the adoption of the Fourteenth
In fact, examining Fourteenth Amendment jurispruAmendment.'
dence, he determined that the Court incorporated precisely this understanding into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The process of incorporation began just six years after the amendment's
adoption with Walker v. Sauvinet,6 1 which affirmed the notion that
"[d]ue process of law is process due according to the law of the land."'62
concurring in judgment).
54. Id at 1047 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). For Justice Scalia's description of
55. Id at 1048-49 (Scalia, J.,
his own judicial philosophy of original intent, see Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 862 (1989) ("The purpose of constitutional guarantees... is
precisely to prevent the law from reflecting certain changes in original values that the society
adopting the Constitution thinks fundamentally undesirable."); see also Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1175, 1185-86 (1989) (expounding his
preference for general rules of law).
56. Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1047-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see MAGNA
CARTA § 39 (1215) ("No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or
exiled or in any way ruined... except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land."), reprintedin MAGNA CARTA 327 (James C. Holt ed., 1965).
concurring in judgment); see RODNEY L.
57. PacificMuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1049 (Scalia, J.,
MoTr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 87-90, 107 (1926).
58. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
59. Pacific MuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1049 (Scalia, J.,concurring in judgment). In Murray's
Lessee plaintiff had been ejected by distress warrant authorized by act of Congress and challenged the validity of that act under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Murray'sLessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 274-75. The Court upheld the procedure, citing its history
at common law. Id at 277-78.
60. Pacific MuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1049-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
61. 92 U.S. 90 (1876).
62. Pacific MuL, 111 S.Ct. at 1049-50 (Scalia, J.,concurring in judgment) (quoting
Walker, 92 U.S. at 93). Defendant in Walker had demanded trial by jury under the Seventh
Amendment, which the Supreme Court denied was applicable to the states. Walker, 92 U.S. at
92-93.

1370

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

By definition, he argued, a procedure that has been the historical practice
of the law is sufficient to provide due process as the term was understood
by the drafters of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."
Justice Scalia next analyzed how the Court has dealt with practices
that were not in existence at the time of adoption of the Due Process
Clause; it is in these cases, according to him, and only in these cases, that
a line of inquiry beyond history is appropriate." He first noted the
Court's holding in Hurtado v. California. that historical practice,
although sufficient to provide due process, is not a necessary component
6
of due process; otherwise, the law would be incapable of change.
Therefore, when government departs from historical practice, it becomes
necessary to formulate a standard for determining whether the new practice comports with due process. 7 It is only at this point, Justice Scalia
argued, that inquiry into "'fundamental principles of liberty and jus69
tice' ,68 becomes appropriate.
Having explained that the first issue in all due process determinations centers upon whether the practice is historically approved, and then
having analyzed the appropriate response to each type of case, Justice
Scalia noted a second issue that the Court's jurisprudence has attached to
all due process analysis: whether the practice violates the Bill of
Rights.7' Over time, he observed, the Court has come to regard virtually
all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights as essential to due process, and
has held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide
these protections regardless of historical precedent.7 1 A new test for due
process emerged.72 Still, when a state's procedure does not violate a right
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the traditional standards (historical
procedure or fundamental fairness) apply as the sole tests.73
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Pacific Mut, 111 S. Ct. at 1049-50 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Id at 1050-51 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884).
Pacific MuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1050 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Id (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Id (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535).
Id (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

70. Id at 1051 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).

71. Id at 1051-52 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 4-6 (1964) (applying Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to state trials);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel);
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54-58 (1947) (denying that Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies to state trials); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)
(Sixth Amendment right to counsel); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323-25 (1937) (denyig application of Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause to states)).
72. Id. at 1052 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
73. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) ("To say that unbroken historical usage can-
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According to Justice Scalia's model, recent decisions that did apply
a fundamental fairness test to all due process cases, without first inquiring into the history of the practice at issue or whether it violates the Bill
of Rights, 4 were wrongly decided as to the broad principle they apply.75
He observed that few of those decisions overturned historically approved
of Rights guarantee;76 those that did,7 7
practices without invoking a Bill
78
Justice Scalia would overrule.

Applying the due process test he enunciated to punitive damages,
Justice Scalia concluded that not only is the majority's fairness analysis
inappropriate, its standards are so weak as to render it meaningless:
I can conceive of no test relating to "fairness" in the abstract
that would approve this procedure, unless it is whether something even more unfair could be imagined. If the imposition of
millions of dollars of liability in this hodge-podge fashion fails
not save a procedure that violates one of the explicit procedural guarantees of the Bill of
Rights (applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment) is not necessarily to say that such
usage cannot demonstrate the procedure's compliance with the more general guarantee of'due
process.' ").

concurring in judgment); see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-87
74. I. (Scalia, J.,
(1985) (fundamental fairness requires state to hire expert witness for indigent defendant in
certain cases); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981) (denying
right to appointed counsel for indigent parent in parental status termination proceeding); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976) (fundamental fairness test applies to termination of social security disability benefits).
75. Pacific Mut, 111 S.Ct. at 1053 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
76. Id. at 1052 (Scalia, J.,concurring in judgment). Mathews, for example, applied a
general due process analysis to a social security termination procedure, which was not a historical practice. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332. For a discussion of Mathews, see infra notes 147-54
and accompanying text.
77. See, eg., Shafer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1977) (requiring minimum contacts
to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969)
(overturning garnishment of wages).
78. PacificMut., 111 S. Ct. at 1053 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia
justified his seemingly injudicious, broad-brush rejection of the line of cases represented by
Shaffer andSniadach on the grounds that the Court's later cases "give [the principle of applying indiscriminate fundamental fairness analysis] nothing but lip service, and by their holdings
reaffirm the view that traditional practice (unless contrary to the Bill of Rights) is conclusive of
'fundamental fairness.' " Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 2117-18 (1990) (upholding practice of transient jurisdiction despite
lack of fundamental fairness). Justice Scalia thus believed that there was no reason to defer to
the earlier cases:
When the rationale of earlier cases (Sniadach and Shaffer) is contradicted by later
holdings-and particularly when that rationale has no basis in constitutional text and
itself contradicts opinions never explicitly overruled-I think it has no valid stare
decisis claim upon me. Our holdings remain in conflict, no matter which course I
take. I choose, then, to take the course that accords with the language of the Constitution and with our interpretation of it through the first half of this century.
PacificMut., 111 S.Ct. at 1053 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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to "jar [the Court's] constitutional sensibilities," it is hard to
say what would.7 9
Asserting that the instruction provided to the jury was "not guidance but
platitude,"8 0 and that the only standard for review was what the court
had awarded in other cases, Justice Scalia concluded that the only rational basis on which the majority could have found that the procedure
comports with due process is that it is historically approved.8 For Justice Scalia, this historical approval is the only test that matters.
Justice Kennedy, concurring separately, endorsed Justice Scalia's
basic reasoning, but approached the issue of the dispositive weight of
historical practice from a slightly different angle.8 2 He stressed that the
reason historical practice merits great weight is that "we have confidence
that a long-accepted legal institution would not have survived if it rested
upon procedures found to be either irrational or unfair."8 3 In his view,
widespread adherence to historical practice creates a strong presumption
that the practice provides due process, but does not necessarily foreclose
further inquiry. 4 Instead, Justice Kennedy left open the possibility that
a case might exist for which widespread historical adherence to a practice
would not prove dispositive;8 5 he determined, however, that the common-law method for assessment of punitive damages did not provide
such a case.8 6 Acknowledging that jury determination of punitive damages generates inconsistent results, 7 Justice Kennedy contended that a
certain amount of nonuniformity inheres in all jury determinations for
two reasons. First, the jury exists on a case-by-case basis; second, the law
often provides the jury with rather general instructions in order to promote flexibility and fairness.8 8 Because juries are asked "'to make the
79. Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1053 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting id. at
1043).
80. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
81. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia made certain to note that the
historical test applicable to due process cases is inappropriate when applied to other provisions
of the Constitution, such as the Equal Protection Clause, which, unlike the Due Process
Clause, "might be thought to have some counterhistorical content." Id. at 1054 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment). It is only because "due process" is an "explicit invocation of the 'law
of the land' " that history is dispositive. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
82. Id at 1054-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
83. Id. at 1054 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
84. Id. at 1054-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
85. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy did not give an example
of a case for which history would not prove conclusive, nor did he enunciate what showing
would be necessary for a finding of unconstitutionality of an ancient practice.
86. Id at 1055 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
87. Id (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment).
88. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification,'

"I'

Jus-

tice Kennedy concluded, "nonuniformity cannot be equated with constitutional infirmity."' He chastised the majority for finding the practice
constitutional in this case and in general, while leaving open the possibility that it might nonetheless violate due process, without offering any
guidance as to the circumstances under which this speculative unconstitutionality would occur.9
Justice O'Connor was the sole dissenter. 92 She offered two arguments to support her conclusion that the common-law method for assessing punitive damages denies defendants due process: 93 the jury
instructions provided in such cases are void for vagueness, and thus violate due process; and further, the Court's holding in Mathews v. Eldridge94 established a test for due process that standard punitive
damages procedure does not meet. 9"
Justice O'Connor first observed that the void-for-vagueness doctrine, which requires that laws contain meaningful standards in order to
afford due process,96 applies even to cases in which the ultimate decisions
are committed to the discretion of the jury. 97 She stated that the Alabama method for imposing punitive damages is unconstitutionally vague
because the judge provides no meaningful guidance to assist the jury
either in deciding whether to impose them, or in determining their
amount. 98
concurring in judgment) (quoting McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
89. Id (Kennedy, J.,
311 (1987)).
90. Id (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
91. Id (Kennedy, J.,concurring in judgment).
92. Id at 1056-67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
dissenting). Although she specifically addressed the defi93. Id at 1067 (O'Connor, J.,
ciencies of the Alabama procedure throughout her opinion, she made it clear that her analysis
dissenting) ('[W]e need
applies to the "common-law scheme" in general. Id (O'Connor, J.,
not dictate to the States the precise manner in which they must address the problem.").
94. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For a discussion of Mathews, see infra notes 147-54 and
accompanying text.
dissenting).
95. PacificMuL, 111 S.Ct. at 1056 (O'Connor, J.,
96. Id at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358
(1983)). For a discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see infra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
97. Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)) ("The void-for-vagueness doctrine applies not only to
laws that proscribe conduct, but also to laws that vest standardiess discretion in the jury to fix
a penalty.").
98. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor argued by analogy to Giaccio v.
dissentPennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966). PacificMuL, 111 S.Ct. at 1057-59 (O'Connor, J.,
ing). Giaccio involved a statute that left to the standardless discretion of the jury the decision
whether to impose court costs on an acquitted criminal defendant; the Court held that the
statute violated due process by its vagueness. Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 401-03. The Pacific Mutual
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The instructions of the Alabama trial judge99 directed the jurors to
do as they felt, Justice O'Connor argued, and provided little or no rational guidance for their decisionmaking process:"0 0 "The State offers no
principled basis for distinguishing those tortfeasors who should be liable
for punitive damages from those who should not be liable."10 1 In addition, once the jury decided to impose punitive damages, their sole guidance in determining the appropriate amount was the judge's admonition
to consider the "character and degree of the wrong" and the "necessity
of preventing similar wrong."" 2 She further observed that the practical
effect of such instructions in Alabama has produced wildly unpredictable
and inconsistent results. For example, in two factually identical insurance fraud cases,10 3 one jury awarded punitive damages fifteen and onehalf times the amount of the compensatory damages, while the other
awarded punitive damages 249 times the amount of the compensatory

award. 14
Justice O'Connor noted that jury instructions featuring more precise
standards are readily available. For example, the Supreme Court of Alabama had formulated seven factors relevant to a review of a punitive
damages award, which she suggested always should be included in jury
instructions.10 5 These factors include: (1) whether the award bears a
reasonable relationship to both the amount of harm done to the plaintiff
and the amount of harm that still could be implicated; (2) the reprehensibility of defendant's conduct measured by its duration, defendant's degree of awareness, attempts at concealment, and defendant's past
conduct; (3) the award's ability not only to remove any profit defendant
has made but also to create a loss; (4) the financial position of defendant;
(5) imposition of costs of litigation on defendant; (6) criminal sanctions
against defendant, as mitigation; and (7) other civil awards against demajority dismissed in a footnote the applications of the Giaccio void-for-vagueness doctrine to
jury determination of punitive damages, drawing the distinction that "[d]ecisions about the
appropriate consequences of violating a law [such as decisions regarding punitive damages] are
significantly different from decisions as to whether a violation has occurred [such as the decision in Giaccio]." PacificMut, 111 S. Ct. at 1046 n.12. For a discussion of Giaccio, see infra
notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying note 23.
100. PacificMuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1057 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 1057-58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1059 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
103. Land & Assocs. v. Simmons, 562 So. 2d 140 (Ala. 1989); Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Strickland, 491 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1985). In both cases, an insurance agent had defrauded the
plaintiff. Simmons, 562 So. 2d at 141-42; Strickland, 491 So. 2d at 873-74.
104. PacificMut., 111 S. Ct. at 1060 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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fendant, as mitigation."°6 Justice O'Connor believed that appellate

courts' post hoc application of these criteria could not cure the harm
caused by vague jury instructions, given that the review would be limited
to the amount of the award and not to its appropriateness. More precise
jury instructions are necessary in order to provide due process.' 0 7

Even if the jury instructions were not void for vagueness, Justice
O'Connor argued, they nonetheless would be inadequate under the threepronged test for procedural due process set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.'" In Mathews the Court held that a determination of whether a
particular practice provides due process turns on a balancing of: (1) the
private interest at stake; (2) the risk that the procedure will wrongly impair that interest weighed against the feasibility of an alternative; and (3)

the state's interest in avoiding the alternative."° Expressly rejecting Justice Scalia's argument that historical practice is dispositive,"10 Justice

O'Connor pointed out that the Mathews Court spoke of due process as
"'flexible'"
and variable according to "'time, place and circumstances.' """ This difference is the crux of her dispute with Justice
Scalia;" 2' he argued that Mathews applies only in those cases in which the
practice in question is not a traditional one," 3 whereas she contended
14
that Mathews applies to all due process cases.'
Given the drastic increase in the frequency and amount of punitive
damages in recent years, Justice O'Connor felt that the time had come to

reevaluate their constitutionality." 5 Applying the Mathews test to common-law punitive damages procedure, Justice O'Connor concluded that
106. Id. at 1060-61 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d
218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1062 (Ala.
1987) (Houston, J., concurring specially))).
107. Id. at 1061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); see Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1061-62 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
109. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
110. Pacific Mu., 111 S. Ct. at 1065 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35).
112. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
113. Pacific Mu., 111 S. Ct. at 1052 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see supra notes
74-78 and accompanying text.
114. Pacific Mu., 111 S. Ct. at 1065 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting). Compare id at 1053
(Scalia, I., concurring in judgment) (Justice Scalia citing his plurality opinion in Burnham v.
Superior Court, 110 S. CL 2105, 2118 (1990), for the proposition that history is controlling)
with id at 1065 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (citing the concurring Burnham opinions of Justices
Brennan, 110 S.Ct. at 2120 (Brennan, J.,
concurring), and White, 110 S.Ct. at 2119 (White,
J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), for the proposition that even traditionally approved procedures must defer to contemporary due process standards).
115. Id at 1066 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 11.

1376

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

the Alabama practice denies defendants due process.1 16 In reaching her

conclusion, Justice O'Connor first examined the private interests at stake
and found them significant.' 1 7 These interests included avoiding potentially uncontrollable liability that may bankrupt a defendant (indeed, the
award may be calculated to do so), and evading the stigma attached to

quasi-criminal punishment." 8
Next, Justice O'Connor examined both the risk that these interests
would be invaded, and the feasibility of a less threatening alternative. 1 9
Because it invites random and in some cases discriminatory deprivations
of property, 12 0 Justice O'Connor concluded that the lack of jury guidance inherent in common-law punitive damages assessment creates an

enormous risk that their imposition will wrongly impair defendants'
property interests.' 2 1 Additionally, she noted that post hoe judicial review does little to alleviate this concern.' 22 Weighing this risk against

the feasibility of an alternative, Justice O'Connor found the risk constitutionally unacceptable.121 The factors set forth by the Alabama Supreme
Court in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby,12 1 she argued, could be incorporated
easily into jury instructions and would provide infinitely greater guidance
25
than the present practice.'

Finally, applying the third Mathews prong, Justice O'Connor determined that, although states do have an interest in deterring wrongful
116. Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1062 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
118. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119. Id at 1062-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120. Id at 1062 (O'Connor, 3., dissenting). Justice O'Connor observed the Court's recognition that jury discretion in awarding punitive damages leads to potentially discriminatory
results; she noted the Court's restrictions on punitive damages in First Amendment and other
cases, on the grounds that the jury may be left free to punish an unpopular defendant or
opinion. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 (1979); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 83
(1971) (Marshall, ., dissenting)).
121. Id at 1062-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 107 and accompanying text.
123. PacificMut., 111 S. Ct. at 1063 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
124. 539 So. 2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d
1050, 1062 (Ala. 1987) (Houston, J., concurring specially)); see supra text accompanying note
106.
125. Pacific Mut, 111 S. Ct. at 1064 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor suggested several additional reforms, including fixing monetary limits by legislation, bifurcating
trials into liability and punitive damages stages, and requiring clear and convincing evidence to
impose punitive damages. Id (O'Connor, ., dissenting). See David G. Owen, The Moral
Foundationsof PunitiveDamages, 40 A-.A. L. REv. 705, 735-38 (1982); Malcolm E. Wheeler,
A Proposalfor FurtherCommon Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages in Modern
Product Liability Litigation, 40 ALA. L. REv. 919, 947-60 (1982).
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conduct, unpredictability in legal consequences of behavior undermines
the overarching legal goal of providing a framework within which citizens may order their behavior. 126 She thus concluded that "'the States
have no substantial interest in securing for plaintiffs . . . gratuitous
awards of money damages far in excess of actual injury. "127 Justice
O'Connor's solution to the constitutional deficiency would require the
states to adopt a more stringent method for providing juries with sufficient guidance for determining both the appropriateness and the amount
of punitive damages.1 2 1 Instead of imposing a uniform standard, however, she would leave it to state legislatures and courts to devise their
129
own methods.

In summary, Pacific Mutual divided the Court four ways. The majority upheld the award because the procedure by which the award was
reached was a historically accepted practice, and because that procedure
as applied in Pacific Mutual was not fundamentally unfair.' a0 Justice
Scalia contended that historical acceptance of the practice should have
been dispositive. 1 1 Justice Kennedy felt that history should have been
controlling in Pacific Mutual, but acknowledged the possibility of a case
for which history would not control. 32 Finally, Justice O'Connor argued that history is irrelevant and concluded that the common-law punitive damages scheme violates due process on the grounds of both
13 3
vagueness and lack of fundamental fairness.
The Court always has operated with a certain uneasiness when defining precisely what due process entails, and often appears to be tornas in Pacific Mutual-between the competing concepts of "law of the
land," advocated by Justice Scalia, and "fundamental fairness," embraced by Justice O'Connor. In the early Fourteenth Amendment case
126. Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1064 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor rejected
plaintiff Haslip's argument that unpredictability is essential to the deterrent effect of punitive
damages, in that if businesses are able to calculate the probability of a predictable award, they
will merely factor it into the cost of the unlawful behavior. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But
see Calfee & Craswell, supra note 6, at 986-89 (arguing that "[o]nly when uncertainty has been
introduced will excessive damage awards tend to increase.., the incentives to overcomply").
127. Pacific Mut, 111 S. Ct. at 1064 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974)).
128. Id at 1067 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129. Id (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130. Id at 1042-46; see supra notes 29-51 and accompanying text.
131. Pacific Mut, 111 S.Ct. at 1054 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); see supra notes
52-81 and accompanying text.
132. Pacific Mut., 111 S.Ct. at 1054-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); see supra
notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
133. Pacific Mut, 111 S. Ct. at 1061, 1067 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 92129 and accompanying text.
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3 4 the Court observed that
of Davidson v. New Orleans"
the term was

"without that satisfactory precision of definition which judicial decisions
have given to nearly all the other guarantees of personal rights" found in
the Constitution. 3 ' Surveying the English roots of due process as Justice
Scalia did in Pacific Mutual,16 the Davidson Court found it somewhat
difficult to apply the original understanding of due process to the practices of the states.13 7 Instead, it determined that the intent of the drafters

is best reached "by the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision shall require, with the reasoning

on which such decisions may be founded."13 In the context of an assessment on real estate, the Court held that, so long as the laws provide a

means for confirming or contesting the assessment in court, with notice
to the person assessed, the judgment necessarily affords due process,
' 139
"however obnoxious it may be to other objections."
In Snyder v. Massachusetts"4 the Court suggested that fairness is,
theoretically, the ultimate measuring rod of due process.141 Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, upheld the constitutionality of a state practice that permitted the jury to view a murder scene in the absence of the
defendant. 4 2 In doing so, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amend-

ment mandates the defendant's presence only to the extent that "a fair
and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence."1 43 In determining
the constitutional threshold of fairness and justice, however, the Court
found that the practice had a long history, dating back to 1747, and thus,
met the standard of fairness embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment
134. 96 U.S. 97 (1877).
135. Id.at 101-02.
136. Pacific MuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1048-49 (Scalia, J.,concurring in judgment); see supra
notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
137. Davidson, 96 U.S. at 102. Because the Magna Carta protected the barons, who controlled Parliament, from the King, the Court reasoned that the protection of "the law of the
land" was originally not envisioned as operating against laws of Parliament. Id. But if such
protection, applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, was not intended to operate
against state legislatures, due process would be meaningless, because a state could "make anything due process of law which, by its own legislation, it chooses to declare such." Id.
138. Id.at 104.
139. Id.at 104-05.
140. 291 U.S. 97 (1934). For Justice Scalia's interpretation of Snyder, see Pacific Mut., I ll
S. Ct. at 1051 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
141. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 116-17.
142. Id.at 122. Defendant Snyder, on trial for first-degree murder, had asked the trial
court to allow him to be present with the jury at their viewing of the crime scene. Id. at 103.
The judge denied his request, permitting only his attorney to go. Id. Defendant was convicted
and his judgment affirmed by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Id. at 102.
143. Id. at 107-08.
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that itself "ha[d] not displaced the procedure of the ages."'" Justice
Kennedy's due process analysis in Pacific Mutual 145 strongly resembles
that of Justice Cardozo in Snyder: both describe fairness as the ultimate
measure of due process, but accord history dispositive weight in determining fairness.' 4 6
More recently, the Court held in Mathews v. Eldridge'4 7 that, at
least in the case of a newly created right or practice, a due process analysis requires balancing private and governmental interests. In Mathews
the plaintiff, whose social security benefits had been terminated prior to a
hearing, challenged the sufficiency of the procedures provided him under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 4' 8 The Court, without
first inquiring into or discussing whether the practice was historical,
noted that "'[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.' "149 It then established the
three factors that Justice O'Connor would have applied in Pacific Mutual: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest weighed against the feasibility of alternative methods;
and (3) the governmental interest in avoiding an alternative method. 5 '
Mathews arguably provides support for Justice O'Connor's notion that
historical practice is not dispositive.' 5 ' In deciding due process cases
52
such as Mathews without mentioning the issue of historical practice,'
the Court left open the question whether it was dropping history from
144. Id at 111.
145. PacificMut, 111 S. Ct. at 1054-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
146. See id at 1054-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Snyder, 291 U.S. at 110-11;
infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
147. 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
148. Id at 324-25.
149. Id at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
150. Id at 335; see supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
151. See Pacific Mut., 111 S. Ct. at 1043; id at 1065 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). But see
PacificMutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1052 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (criticizing Mathews and
other due process opinions for "indiscriminately appl[ying] balancing analysis to determine
'fundamental fairness' "without regard for historical practice); supra text accompanying notes
64-69 (discussing Justice Scalia's concept of the proper role of balancing test in due process
analysis).
152. See, eg., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-87 (1985) (not examining the validity of a
historical practice, but imposing the duty on trial courts to provide certain indigent defendants
access to a psychiatrist's assistance and expertise); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452
U.S. 18, 27-32 (1981) (not examining the validity of a historical practice, but applying Mathews
to determine that there is no automatic due process right to appointed counsel for indigent
parents in state parental status termination proceeding). But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186, 212 (1977) (striking down historical practice of quasi in rem jurisdiction absent minimum
contacts with forum); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (overturning
historical practice of wage garnishment).
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due process analysis '5 3 or simply ignoring the issue of history in cases
where the Court was not actually overturning a historically accepted procedure.1 54 This unresolved question is the vortex of the tension between
55
Justices O'Connor and Scalia.1
Another apparent counterweight to historical-practice analysis is
the void-for-vagueness doctrine. In Giaccio v. Pennsylvania the jury acquitted the defendant of wantonly discharging a firearm. 5 6 It imposed
the costs of prosecution on him nonetheless, under a state statute 157 that
gave the jury the option of awarding costs against a defendant it had
acquitted when it felt defendant was guilty of some wrong, albeit not of
the crime charged. 5 8 Although the law had existed since 1860, prior to
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court, without any reference to the antiquity of the procedure, held that the statute violated the
Due Process Clause because of its vagueness.15 9 The Court reiterated its
understanding of due process as the law of the land, but held that
"[i]mplicit in this constitutional safeguard is the premise that the law
must be one that carries an understandable meaning with legal standards
that courts must enforce."'" The Court reasoned, in other words, that
any law that provides no standard for compliance is no law at all. Certainly, it cannot be "the law of the land," the only legitimate means by
which a person may be deprived of property. A historically accepted
practice that "leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally
fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular
1 61
case" is void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause.
153. This position lies at the heart of Justice O'Connor's argument in Pacific Mutual. See
Pacific Mul., 111 S. Ct. at 1065-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (contending that "[a]lthough
history creates a strong presumption of continued validity," no procedure can escape scrutiny
under Mathews); supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
154. This interpretation reflects Justice Scalia's view, in PaciicMutual, of the Court's recent jurisprudence. See Pacific Mutual, 111 S. Ct. at 1052-53 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that the rationale in Mathews is limited to cases that do not strike down a
traditionally approved procedure). Unable to distinguish cases such as Sniadach and Shaffer,
which overturned historical practices, Justice Scalia must view them as wrongly decided. Id.
at 1053 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
155. See infra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
156. 382 U.S. 399, 400 (1966).
157. Id. (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1222 (1964), repealed by Judiciary Act Repealer Act, 1978 Pa. Laws 202).
158. Id at 403-04.
159. Id at 402-03. The statute contained "no standards at all," nor did it "place any
conditions of any kind upon the jury's power to impose costs upon a defendant who has been
found by the jury to be not guilty of a crime charged against him." Id. at 403. As a result, a
person could not order his behavior in any way to assure compliance with the law. Id.
160. Id at 403.
161. Id at 402-03.
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Although it held constitutional the common-law procedure by which
punitive damages are awarded, 162 the Court in Pacific Mutual indicated
that an excessive amount might be constitutionally unacceptable nonetheless.1 63 Long ago the Court said in dictum that a disproportionate
damages award may trigger a violation of due process, despite the adequacy of the procedure by which it was reached.' In Waters-PierceOil
Co. v. Texas 161 the Court refused to overturn the state's fines for the
violation of antitrust laws, despite defendant's contention that the fines
were so excessive as to violate due process.1 66 The Court held that fixing
penalties fell within the police power of the state, but recognized that the
Court still could interfere with that power in some instances, "if the fines
imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law."1 67 Thus, the Court paved the way for
an eventual conclusion that even when the particular procedure itself is
legitimate, if the amount reached under it in a particular case is egregious, the award will be unconstitutional.
Before Pacific Mutual, then, potential avenues for a due process attack on a punitive damages award included the lack of fundamental fairness,1 68 the vagueness of the procedure by which it was reached, 169 and
the excessiveness of the amount. 170 In recent years, the Court has come
ever closer to conducting a due process analysis in the context of punitive
damages. In Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,17 1 for example,
defendant challenged the validity of a punitive damages award under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.1 72 Because this issue
had not been raised in the court below, the Court unanimously refused to
address it.17 1 Justices O'Connor and Scalia, however, expressed serious
162. Pacific Mut., 111 S.Ct. at 1043.
163. See id. ('[U]nlimited jury discretion ...in the fixing of punitive damages may invite
extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities.") (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909)).
164. Waters-PierceOil, at 111 (1909).
165. The jury had assessed penalties against defendant of $1,500 per day for the period of
May 31, 1900 to March 3, 1903 for violation of one act, and $50 per day for the period of April
1, 1903 to April 29, 1907; the total penalty was $1,623,500. Id at 96-97.
166. Id at 111. Defendant did not argue that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of excessive fines applied to the states. Id
167. Id
168. See supra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
171. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
172. Id at 76. Defendant also advanced a challenge under the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment. Id
173. Id at 76-80. The Court rejected the Eighth Amendment argument on the same
grounds. Id The following year, the Court eliminated the possibility of an Eighth Amend-
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doubts that the punitive damages award comported with due process,
and indicated an eagerness to address the issue in the future. 7 4
Pacific Mutual is the first case in which the Court has placed common-law punitive damages in the context of Fourteenth Amendment due
process. In doing so, the Court encountered the theoretical conflict between the two aspects of due process: the principle of depriving a defendant of property only by the law of the land17 versus the principle of
fundamental fairness to the defendant, 1 76 which arguably is the essence
of due process. These two principles do not always, or even usually,
clash; when a procedure is both historically approved and fundamentally

fair, it necessarily provides due process. Conversely, when a procedure
possesses neither of those attributes, it necessarily denies due process. In

addition, when a procedure is not historically-approved, the only test for
due process is its fairness. Thus, the friction between the two competing
claims of due process present in PacificMutual arises only when the fairness of a traditionally approved practice is called into question. Because
the opinions of Justices Scalia and O'Connor both reflect assumptions
177
that the traditional method for assessing punitive damages is unfair,

but arrive at antithetical conclusions as to whether history or fairness is
controlling in a due process determination, they squarely frame the debate on the competing principles of due process. It is in the context of
this debate that the majority's reasoning is best understood.

Justice Scalia envisions due process as a method of achieving at least
minimal fairness by ensuring that people not be deprived of their rights
ment challenge in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257 (1989). The
majority rejected the defendant's valid argument based on the Excessive Fines Clause, holding
that it applies only to criminal actions and civil actions that the government prosecutes or by
which it becomes entitled to a share of the damages awarded. Id. at 263-64. Justice O'Connor
disagreed, constructing an elaborate argument based on the history of amercements in England, from which fines originated, which she believed indicated that the antecedents of the
Excessive Fines Clause depicted punitive damages as fines. Id at 282-301 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). As in Bankers Life, defendant also improperly
raised a due process issue, which the Court refused to address. Id. at 276-77.
174. Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 87-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Justice O'Connor stated:
Appellant has touched on a due process issue that I think is worthy of the Court's
attention in an appropriate case. Mississippi law gives juries discretion to award any
amount of punitive damages in any tort case in which a defendant acts with a certain
mental state. In my view, because of the punitive character of such awards, there is
reason to think that this may violate the Due Process Clause.
Id at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
175. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 140-55 and accompanying text.
177. See PacificMut., 111 S. Ct. at 1053 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1056 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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except in accordance with an established legal process. That he perceives
fairness as the underlying policy of the Due Process Clause is demonstrated by his approval of the Court's recognition of" 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice' "17 as the only standard by which to judge
due process in the absence of traditional practice. Thus, Justice Scalia's
analysis of the proper relation between the law of the land ad fairness is
that by adopting the Due Process Clause, the framers intended to impose
upon the states a certain guarantee of minimal fairness to their citizens.
Namely, this fairness ensured that they would not be deprived of their
property except in accordance with the law of the land; that guarantee
remains in effect when a state changes its laws.' 79 But Justice Scalia argued that when the established law of the land is itself unfair, the Due
Process Clause provides no recourse, because the clause specifically invokes the law of the land, and not general fairness, as the measure of
compliance. 180 The clause is not, for him, a general license for the federal courts to police the fairness of all the laws of the states.
Conversely, Justice O'Connor perceives the Due Process Clause as
just such a license for free judicial review of state procedures, and
thereby departs from Justice Scalia's position. Relying on the Mathews
concept of due process as flexible, the essence of her argument is that the
Court in recent years properly has stripped compliance with the law of
the land from due process analysis, in order to implement more effectively and directly the Due Process Clause's underlying principle of fairness. Because she makes no concession to historical practice in her
analysis, she presumably believes that it has no place in determining due
process, and that a modem fairness test, similar to the balancing test in
Mathews, applies to all cases.' 8 ' Justice O'Connor, however, does not
address Justice Scalia's contention that Mathews, which scrutinized a social security administrative procedure and its kin, are distinguishable
from cases such as Pacific Mutual, insofar as the former involve only
178. Id. at 1050 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110

U.S. 516, 535 (1884)).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69.
concurring in judgment).
180. See PacificMut, 11 S.Ct. at 1054 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting). Justice O'Connor stated:
181. See id. at 1066-67 (O'Connor, J.,
[Tihe time has come to reassess the constitutionality of a time-honored practice....

The Due Process Clause demands that we possess some degree of confidence that the
procedures employed to deprive persons of life, liberty, and property are capable of
producing fair and reasonable results. When we lose that confidence, a change must
be made.
dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J.,
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nonhistorical practices.182
From this perspective, it becomes apparent that Justice Kennedy,
who seems to offer a mere modification of Justice Scalia's opinion, 18 3 actually views due process in a manner more similar to the vision of Justice
O'Connor. Justice Kennedy's argument is that history should be dispositive not because it is the ultimate measure of due process, but because a
strong presumption exists that a practice that has lasted throughout the
ages cannot be unfair.'" Thus, for him, at least in theory-but for Justice O'Connor in practice-fairness is the ultimate measuring rod of due
process. His analysis, however, and his conclusion that the common-law
punitive damages scheme is not unfair within the meaning of due process.85 indicate he would rarely find that the unfairness of a practice outweighs its historical acceptance. Only when the practice is so unfair that
it undermines even the minimal guarantee of fairness provided by the
Due Process Clause would Justice Kennedy find a constitutional violation. Thus, although he began, as did Justice O'Connor, with the premise that fairness is the ultimate test of due process,"8 6 the threshold of
fairness he would apply to a traditional practice is so high that the result
of his analysis resembles that of Justice Scalia. Justice Kennedy attempts
to reconcile history and fairness by equating the two concepts. 87
The Pacific Mutual majority attempted to place the historically approved method for awarding punitive damages into the context of due
process without first making the necessary choice between history and
fairness, or at least fixing the relationship between the two. Instead, it
gave great weight to the historical acceptance of the practice, and applied
an attenuated fairness test as well.18 8 The result is that the Court proceeded-without the guidance of a priori principles for interpreting the
Due Process Clause-to reach implicitly essentially the same result Justice Scalia would reach explicitly. The effect of the decision on the area
of state-imposed punitive damages is to affirm the constitutionality of the
process by which they are awarded, imposing a hopelessly vague standard of fairness, and leaving open, as Justice Scalia would not, the possibility of an unconstitutionally excessive result.18 9 The decision has the
182. For Justice O'Connor's argument that a "static notion of due process" was rejected by
both Mathews and the majority in Pacific Mutual, see id. at 1065 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. See id at 1054-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
184. Pacific Mut, 111 S. Ct. at 1054 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
185. Id. at 1055 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
186. Id. at 1054-55 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
187. See id. at 1055 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
188. See supra notes 29-51 and accompanying text.
189. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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further effect of adopting the historical method of due process analysis
endorsed by Justice Scalia; the Court indirectly subordinated the "fundamental fairness" test to historical practice without actually eliminating
it. 190 Thus, the majority followed Justice Scalia's lead in substance even
though it maintains the formality of the balancing test.
The Pacific Mutual Court, by its reference to Waters-PierceOil Co.
v. Texas, 19 1 indicated that a punitive damages award may violate due
process by its size as well as by the method pursuant to which it is rendered. 192 It then decided the case by considering the fairness of the procedure. 193 It purported to limit its decision to the Alabama guidelines, 194
but because the procedure for assessing punitive damages is essentially
the same in all states, 9 5 the Court effectively held constitutional the
common-law punitive damages scheme in all states. As a result, the only
remaining basis for constitutional challenge is the amount of an award;
that proporthe Court indicated that it maintains a strong presumption
19 6
tionality is guaranteed by state appellate review.
The Court failed to adopt any clear principles upon which to base a
determination of the fairness of a historically accepted practice; this failure led it to an unclear conclusion as to what due process requires of
state courts in evaluating their procedures for awarding punitive damages. Specifically, the Court left three major issues unresolved. First,
although it evaluated Alabama's practice in light of three considerations-the sufficiency of guidance to the jury, the adequacy of trial court
review, and the adequacy of appellate review 9 7 -the Com-t did not give
any indication whether these considerations are necessary to such an
evaluation, or whether the specific features it noted in Alabama's procedure are necessary to afford due process.19 8 Second, the Court was am190. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
191. 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909); see supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
192. Pacific MuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1043.
193. Id. at 1044-46. Although it considered the award "close to the line," the Court found
it appropriate because it "did not lack objective criteria." Id at 1046.
194. Id at 1044.
195. See id at 1056 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
196. See id at 1045.
197. See id at 1044-45.
198. Already state supreme courts have diverged on this matter. Alabama has considered
its standards to be constitutionally mandated. See Valley Bldg. & Supply, Inc. v. Lombus, 590
So. 2d 142, 147 (Ala. 1991); Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 586 So. 2d 854, 856-59
(Ala. 1991); Seaboard Sys. R.R. v. Russell, 582 So. 2d 1092, 1094 (Ala. 1991). Other courts
have interpreted Pacific Mutual more liberally. Upholding Mississippi's post-trial review,
which is more deferential than Alabama's, the Fifth Circuit held in Eichenseer v. Reserve Life
Insurance Co., 934 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1991), that "the procedural protection adequate to
support the constitutionality of a punitive damages award varies with the circumstances," em-
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biguous as to whether its requirement that there be a "rational
relationship in determining whether a particular award is greater than
reasonably necessary to punish and deter"19' 9 mandates consideration of

defendant's financial condition in post-trial and appellate review for excessiveness.20

Finally, it is uncertain whether the Court's statement that

it refused to "draw a mathematical bright line," ' ' while it simultaneously held that the proportion of punitive to compensatory damages in
Pacific Mutual was "close to the line,"202 requires any specific ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.20 3
Pacific Mutual's significance to the jurisprudence of due process is
greater than it appears on the surface of the Court's circuitous opinion.
As Justice Scalia observed, the "fairness" test which the majority purports to add to the historical analysis is extraordinarily weak.2" The
Court, though not explicitly rejecting it, reduced almost to surplusage
the role of "fairness" analysis in cases in which a practice is historically
approved.20 5 In deferring to historical practice, the Court implicitly re-

jected Justice O'Connor's argument that Mathews v. Eldridge imposed a
flexible due process test on all procedures, including those for which a
phasizing "the fact intensive nature of the due process analysis articulated in Haslip." Id. at
1385-86; accord Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (S.C. 1991).
Other courts, however, seem to sidestep Pacific Mutual altogether, reviewing punitive
damages by their own standards. See, e.g., Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 107 Nev. 317, 319, 810
P.2d 790, 792-93 (1991) (dismissing defendant's due process argument with the assertion that
PacificMutual stands for the proposition that "the availability of punitive damages is accepted
as settled law by nearly all state and federal courts," and reducing award from $22,500,000 to
$5,000,000 based on its own concept of disproportionality).
199. Pacific MuL, 111 S. Ct. at 1045-46.
200. Again, lower courts are split. Compare Principal Fin. Group v. Thomas, 585 So. 2d
816, 818 (Ala. 1991) (holding that such consideration is essential to determining excessiveness)
with Adams v. Murakami, 54 Cal. 3d 105, 116-17, 813 P.2d 1348, 1355-56, 24 Cal. Rptr. 318,
325-26 (1991) (holding that PacificMutual "weighs strongly in favor of requiring evidence of a
defendant's financial condition" but does not require it).
201. PacificMut., 111 S.Ct. at 1043.
202. Id. at 1046.
203. Once more, there is confusion among lower court judges. Compare PrincipalFin.
Group, 585 So. 2d at 819 (Houston, J., concurring) ("I do not know whether this indicates that
there must be some kind of proportionality between compensatory damages and punitive damages. I trust that it does not. ...") with Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner, 586 So. 2d
854, 860 (Ala. 1991) (Maddox, J., concurring) (concluding that Pacific Mutual's guidelines
include considering the size of punitive damages compared to actual loss).
204. Pacific Mut., 111 S.Ct. at 1053 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
205. Justice Scalia read the "fairness" analysis completely out of the Court's opinion: noting that recent cases have given "nothing but lip service" to the view that "fundamental fairness" is not conclusively demonstrated by traditional practice, he stated that nothing other
than deference to history could explain the majority's decision. Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring in
judgment).
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traditional practice exists.2oc Instead, the Court applied not a Mathews
test, but a much weaker "fairness" analysis. PacificMutual epitomizes a
trend in which the Court is slowly turning away from "fairness" and
back toward history as the basis of analysis, with Justice Scalia leading
the way.2"7 The due process debate in Pacific Mutual was recently
replayed almost verbatim in Schad v. Arizona,2 "8 which upheld the state's
practice of allowing a jury to reach a verdict of first-degree murder on
separate theories.2 19 The Schad plurality announced that the history of
the practice is to be given great weight, but then considered the fairness
of the practice.210 Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, argued that
"[u]nless we are here to invent a Constitution rather than enforce one, it
is impossible that a practice as old as the common law and still in existence in the vast majority of States does not provide that process which is
'due.' )211 As in Pacific Mutual, he contended that the plurality's analy206. See id at 1061-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); supra notes 108-14 and accompanying
text. Again, what the majority does indirectly, Justice Scalia proclaims directly: "Such cases
[as Mathews], at least in their broad pronouncements if not with respect to the particular
provisions at issue, were in my view wrongly decided." PacificMuL, 111 S Ct. at 1053 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
207. This trend began last term in Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990), in
which a plurality, led by Justice Scalia, upheld the doctrine of transient jurisdiction on the
grounds of historical acceptance, emphasizing the "tradition" in "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice," and holding that the minimum-contacts analysis of Shafer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), did not apply to cases involving in-state service. Burnham, 110
S. Ct. at 2109-17 (plurality opinion). See generally Douglas A. Mays, Note, Burnham v. Superior Court: The Supreme CourtAgrees on TransientJurisdictionin Practice,But Not in Theory,
69 N.C. L. REV.1270 (1991) (analyzing Burnham).
The debate in PacificMutual between Justices O'Connor and Scalia epitomizes the fundamental rift between conservative judicial activism, as exemplified by Justice O'Connor's approach to Pacific Mutual, see supra notes 92-129 and accompanying text, and judicial
conservatism, as exemplified by Justice Scalia's approach to the same case, see supra notes 5281 and accompanying text. This division is becoming a key element of debate in the Court.
See Beau J. Brock, Mr. Justice Antonin Scalia: A Renaissanceof Positivism and Predictability
in ConstitutionalAdjudication,51 LA. L. REV.623, 637-49 (1991) (contrasting the approaches
taken by Justices O'Connor and Scalia in Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, 110 S.
Ct. 2972 (1990) (informed consent for abortion); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S.Ct. 2926
(1990) (same); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990) (right to die);
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185 (1990) (diversity jurisdiction); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City
of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990) (obscenity); Penny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (cruel and
unusual punishment)). The author concludes that the essence of this debate is the conflict
between "Justice Scalia's use of positivism and history in attempting to establish legal certainty" and "Justice O'Connor's... balanc[ing] the interests of the conflicting societal elements in each case." Id. at 637.
208. 111 S.Ct. 2491 (1991).
209. Id. at 2497 (plurality opinion).
210. Id. at 2497-505 (plurality opinion); see James J. McGuire, Note, Schad v. Arizona:
Diminishingthe Need for Verdict Specificity, 70 N.C. L. REv. 936, 964-67 (1992).
211. Schad, 111 S.Ct. at 2507 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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2 12
sis "ultimately relies upon nothing but historical practice."
The effect of Pacific Mutual on the law is thus twofold. First, it
affirms the constitutionality under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of state common-law punitive damages assessment,
leaving open the slim possibility that a jury award may be so grossly
excessive as to deny due process. More fundamentally from a jurisprudential point of view, it represents a movement toward the historical approach to due process.
The Court could have avoided a great deal of confusion by fully
adopting Justice Scalia's opinion, which reaches the same result in a
manner far more direct, lucid, logical, and elegant. As Justice Scalia
convincingly demonstrates, both the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment and most of the cases construing it indicate that historical practice
is dispositive. The Court's simultaneous enervation and perfunctory execution of "fairness" analysis contributes nothing to the law and much to
the confusion surrounding it. Indeed, although it stumbled on the correct general result, the Court's fuzzy reasoning accounts for its failure to
establish any meaningful standard of review of state practice, or to settle
the issue of the size of a jury award required to trigger a violation of due
process. Because most punitive damages awards are challenged on the
basis of their size, a large gap remains in the law, one which should have
been filled. In the words of Justice Kennedy, "[ilt is difficult to comprehend on what basis the majority believes the common-law method might
violate due process in a particular case after it has approved that method
as a general matter, and this tension in its analysis now must be resolved
in some later case." 2 3 Although the Court often leaves unresolved tensions, it could have avoided the one left in Pacific Mutual by adopting
Justice Scalia's opinion. The Court has placed the burden of reforming
2 14
the method for assessment of punitive damages squarely on the states,
but has given them scant guidance as to what it is the Constitution requires. Fortunately, the Court emphasized that its holding is limited to
the facts of the case.2" ' State courts would do well to take the Court at
its word.
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212. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
213. Pacific Mut, 111 S. Ct. at 1055 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
214. As the Court noted, Alabama already had imposed limits on punitive damages before
the case reached the Supreme Court (but after the cause of action arose). Id. at 1044 n.9; see
Act of 1987, No. 87-185, §§ 1, 2, 4, 1987 Ala. Acts 87-185 (codified at ALA. CODE §§ 6-11-20
to -30 (1991)).
215. PacificMut., 111 S. Ct. at 1043.

